Epistemology & Skepticism 
What We Can and Cannot Know
about Absolute Realty

In epistemology (the study of knowledge - how do we know what we know? etc.), knowledge is the link between the world outside of us and the world within us. We each live inside our skulls, connected to the external world through the frail means of our sense perceptions. How can we be sure that the beliefs and opinions, shaped by our subjective experiences, are a reliable representation of what actually exists independently of our awareness? Indeed we can even question whether or not anything exists apart from our consciousness. The tenuousness and limited understanding of our grasp of reality fuels our desire for certainty, making the quest for knowledge one of the hallmarks of humanity. The universal human drive for the attainment of knowledge attests to the power and advantage of epistemic states.

In the modern era, science has provided tremendous benefits to the human condition, as well as reliable insight into the processes that produce the world around us. But what about the processes by which we know the world? Science, as usually construed, is not adequate to explore the subjective world, as science is, by definition, public and repeatable. Consciousness is, by definition, private and unique. It is the solitary nature of internal awareness which is the strongest argument for solipsism. Knowledge cannot be absorbed by any other means than subjective experience. This makes knowledge prey to the frailties and limitations of humanity.

It is from these human frailties and limitations which skepticism is born. It is our capacity for error, misunderstanding and self-delusion which calls knowledge into question. The ubiquitous struggle to achieve knowledge would indicate that knowledge does seem to exist, as does the impressive body of information compiled through cultural and scientific means, unless all of humanity is somehow deluded. If knowledge does exist, just how we can be sure our subjective interpretation of sense data is correct and accurately reflects reality? How can we really know, and know that we know, without the danger of self-delusion? As I see it, this is the heart of skepticism.

 

The Greatest Threat - The Representational Theory of Mind

In Descartes: The Project of Pure Inquiry, Bernard Williams explicates the main problems in the representational theory of mind. Unlike Cartesian "Evil Genius" Skepticism and Solipsism, which both doubt there is an external reality independent of the subjective experiencer, this form of skepticism assumes that there is some independently existing reality that our minds try to comprehend and represent.

The skepticism arises in the question of the accuracy of our limited subjective representations of an infinite, objective reality. This dilemma remains even if certainty is not the goal of knowledge. The existence of the gap between our minds and external reality severely hampers the authority of both our senses and our sciences. Even if the gap is small, it is still enough for error and delusion to creep in. With empiricism's credibility severally limited by human subjectivity, how can we ever be in a position to evaluate how accurately our beliefs and opinions reflect the actuality of existence?

The quest for knowledge is the search for what the cosmos is really like, independent of our minds. But a truly absolute conception of reality would entail an account of the subjective consciousness contained within it, not only because subjective critters inhabit it, but also because it is a conscious critter doing the investigating and conceptualizing. Consciousness cannot be abstracted out of a complete description of absolute reality. Any representation of absolute reality must account for subjectivity and multiple points of view if it is to avoid falling into solipsism (the belief that only I exist and you, dear reader, are a projection of my consciousness - or I am your projection...).

The representational theory of mind seeks to primarily deal with two problems:

1. the error problem, and
2. the subjectivity problem.

My interpretation of my sense data can be mistaken, my beliefs may be incorrect, or I may simply be deluded or in denial. The problem of error disconnects our minds from reality. This means that although external reality exists, I am denied access to it because I cannot traverse the gap between it and my mistaken mind. To have knowledge of reality, there must be some valid connection between the subjective self and the external reality. An accurate internalized representation of reality implies the existence of its opposite, that is, an inaccurate representation, or more simply put, error.

To have real knowledge of an objective reality, I must find an objective starting point within my subjective self, which is not liable for error, bias or delusion. But even that which we consider to be objective, is itself subject to our internal processes, which generate a gap between us and reality into which error can creep. Any human point of view is subjective- it can't be any other way. And to be subjective is to be liable to error and misconstrual. This leads to the second problem of the Representational Theory of Mind: the Problem of Subjectivity.

It seems impossible for limited, subjective creatures to truly comprehend absolute objectivity. Even if my beliefs are true, I may not believe the appropriate things. It is possible to occasionally be accurate without understanding. Even a broken clock is correct twice a day, as the old saying goes.

A conception of reality is intentional, not accidental. As long as my representation of reality can fail, there are grounds for skepticism. This bypasses the issues of certainty or evil geniuses. It is a question of whether we can formulate an idea of what exists apart from our limited monkey minds (but still inclusive of minds) that accurately reflects absolute reality.

An Absolute Conception of Reality (ACR) is itself an idea of what we suppose to exist. According to Williams, if knowledge is possible, it has to be possible to form a coherent conception of its object. This coherent concept of the absolute must also be independent of subjectivity and its constraints. An ACR is just a conception "of something." We must first get a conception of a thing, and then determine if our conception actually represents accurately what it is supposed to represent.

Williams claims that the ACR should not contain secondary properties as a primary aspect. Secondary qualities are to be included in the mental aspect of the ACR. The ACR should be a description of everything which exists-plus minds.

Although the body of theories and data produced by science is impressive, I believe Williams is mistaken in his dismissal of the threat of the Representational Theory of Mind to the question of the nature of reality. Our science could only be confirming what we are already constrained to discover by the limits of our minds. The actuality of reality could be far beyond our conceptions or comprehension. Physics allows us to make fairly reliable predictions about the world, but is this grounds to say that these predictions would hold true even without minds to make them?

The only way we have of dealing with this question is through the medium of our minds. Other cultures have had radically different conceptions of reality. Is our western empirical science true because it has amassed a lot of supporting data and all other views false because they have not? If all adherents of a world view are dead, does that mean that world view was mistaken? If a world view does not produce empirical data to bolster its concepts, does that mean it is wrong?

 

The Way Out

The Ancient Greeks resemble us moderns in the seriousness with which we regard skepticism. Plato, however, sidestepped a lot of the difficulties which have dogged modern epistemology. For Plato, the criteria of knowledge was not as rigorous as those applied in later eras. For Plato, knowledge consisted merely of a true belief and logos- that is, an explanation or reason in this view, understanding consists in seeing the connections between as opposed to the more contemporary search for justification and certainty. Understanding, to Plato, is a skill directed towards a body of material, not towards the truth value of a single proposition. Knowledge is the perception of how things fit together, and this skillful awareness of interconnection is what allows accomplishment. This is a very different goal than that of certainly or justification.

Plato's conception of the ideal forms served as his ACR. Plato thought the senses unreliable because the physical world is an impure mixture of all the forms. The forms (or coneptual ideals that reside in a holistic state) themselves are pure, but our world is all combined together. Multiple parts come together and our sense perception may or may not apprehend the different aspects of the combination.

But, Plato assures us that the mind can come to apprehend the pure forms through the process of reason. Under this view, mental apprehension has the potential to be more accurate than sense perception or empirical data. Apprehension of a form is a mental understanding of a pure expression, free from the contradictions and occlusions of particulars- this is what makes it knowledge, as opposed to true opinion.

This use of the forms as ACR matches at least one of Williams' criteria: that is, it is an objective view of a mind-independent reality which accounts for minds. As far as Williams' second criteria (that of accurately representing reality), that yet remains to be proven.

However, Plato's use of forms, for all the difficulties that entails, does allow for many things not included in other ACRs. Plato's forms, in their impure mixtures, allows for degrees of truth. The degree of a belief's rational coherence is equivalent to the percent of purity of form in the conception. Truth and falsehood is not always black or white in human experience. Shades of gray reflect the nearness to formal purity. Reason and the subjective apprehension of a larger order serve as the test of the truth of our beliefs.

Under Plato's position, the truth resides within us and we must refine it through the process of the dialectic. Hence, reason and introspection fill the gap between us and the ACR. I am reminded of Michelangelo's attitude toward sculpture: he believed that the finished piece of art existed inside the uncarved marble- his job was to remove what was not needed.

Likewise, the truth exists within us-but it remains for us to refine it from the raw ore of our beliefs and opinions. Of course, this view is dependent on rigorous mental training and constant internal questioning in order to determine what is true, but it put humanity in direct contact with the ACR through the medium of reason, producing knowledge.

 

Escaping Regress and Evil Geniuses

A Platonic view of knowledge avoids regress, as justification is unnecessary. A Platonic construal of knowledge assumes a direct connection between the cosmos and our minds. We can internally accesses the truth (provided we are trained in the process of asking ourselves the right questions), without the resort to the support of propositions.

A looser definition of knowledge, coupled with an ACR based on the forms, produces an epistemology more concerned with understanding the larger context, rather than trying to prove the truth value of a single proposition or group of propositions. E.g. skepticism is also quickly dispatched, as it relies on Cartesian dualism, which assumes an insurmountable chasm between mind and external reality. Under the Platonic model, this chasm is not only spanned, it is eliminated, as humanity holds the potential for knowledge within. Platonic knowledge is holistic and not dualistic.

 

Conclusion

The three main attacks of skepticism on epistemology are, at the bottom, only different facets of the same problem. All three arise from human uncertainty and fear of error. All three have a similar distrust of human mental capacities to recognize the truth. Plato not only transcends these fears and limitations, he provides the means for testing the accuracy of our representations of reality through the rigors of the dialectic.

But even if I am wrong in lumping together the three types of skepticism as one big problem, only Plato's position satisfies all three. According to the principles of parsimony, one simple solution is preferable to several more complex solutions.

Both foundationalism and coherentism are concerned with the justification of propositions, and not with any larger understanding of wider contexts. In this respect, they are dangerously shortsighted. By focusing on semantic minutiae, they ignore critical issues and risk irrelevance.

Plato's approach is not only more comprehensive, it is also more pragmatic and relevant to human experience. I recognize that Plato's theory of forms does have its share of difficulties, but it seems to me a more promising approach than any others we have explored thus far.

 

Bibliography

Jon Molin, Plato's Theory of Understanding, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, WI, London, 1981

Ronald M. Polansky, Philosophy and Knowledge- A commentary on Plato's Theaetetus, Associated University Press, Cranbury, New York, London, Ontario, 1992

Bernard Williams, Descartes: The Project of Pure Inquiry

 

In the modern era, science has provided tremendous benefits to the human condition, as well as reliable insight into the processes that produce the world around us. But what about the processes by which we know the world? Science, as usually construed, is not adequate to explore the subjective world, as science is, by definition, public and repeatable. Consciousness is, by definition, private and unique. It is the solitary nature of internal awareness which is the strongest argument for solipsism. Knowledge cannot be absorbed by any other means than subjective experience. This makes knowledge prey to the frailties and limitations of humanity.

It is from these human frailties and limitations which skepticism is born. It is our capacity for error, misunderstanding and self-delusion which calls knowledge into question. The ubiquitous struggle to achieve knowledge would indicate that knowledge does seem to exist, as does the impressive body of information compiled through cultural and scientific means, unless all of humanity is somehow deluded. If knowledge does exist, just how we can be sure our subjective interpretation of sense data is correct and accurately reflects reality? How can we really know, and know that we know, without the danger of self-delusion? As I see it, this is the heart of skepticism.

The Greatest Threat - The Representational Theory of Mind

In Descartes: The Project of Pure Inquiry, Bernard Williams explicates the main problems in the representational theory of mind. Unlike Cartesian Evil Genius Skepticism and Solipsism, which both doubt there is an external reality independent of the subjective experiencer, this form of skepticism assumes that there is some independently existing reality that our minds try to comprehend and represent.

The skepticism arises in the question of the accuracy of our limited subjective representations of an infinite, objective reality. This dilemma remains even if certainty is not the goal of knowledge. The existence of the gap between our minds and external reality severely hampers the authority of both our senses and our sciences. Even if the gap is small, it is still enough for error and delusion to creep in. With empiricism’s credibility severally limited by human subjectivity, how can we ever be in a position to evaluate how accurately our beliefs and opinions reflect the actuality of existence?

The quest for knowledge is the search for what the cosmos is really like, independent of our minds. But a truly absolute conception of reality would entail an account of the subjective consciousness contained within it, not only because subjective critters inhabit it, but also because it is a conscious critter doing the investigating and conceptualizing. Consciousness cannot be abstracted out of a complete description of absolute reality. Any representation of absolute reality must account for subjectivity and multiple points of view if it is to avoid falling into solipsism (the belief that only I exist and you, dear reader, are a projection of my consciousness - or I am your projection...).

The representational theory of mind seeks to primarily deal with two problems: 1) the error problem, and 2) the subjectivity problem.

My interpretation of my sense data can be mistaken, my beliefs may be incorrect, or I may simply be deluded or in denial. The problem of error disconnects our minds from reality. This means that although external reality exists, I am denied access to it because I cannot traverse the gap between it and my mistaken mind. To have knowledge of reality, there must be some valid connection between the subjective self and the external reality. An accurate internalized representation of reality implies the existence of its opposite, that is, an inaccurate representation, or more simply put, error.

To have real knowledge of an objective reality, I must find an objective starting point within my subjective self, which is not liable for error, bias or delusion. But even that which we consider to be objective, is itself subject to our internal processes, which generate a gap between us and reality into which error can creep. Any human point of view is subjective- it can’t be any other way. And to be subjective is to be liable to error and misconstrual. This leads to the second problem of the Representational Theory of Mind: the Problem of Subjectivity.

It seems impossible for limited, subjective creatures to truly comprehend absolute objectivity. Even if my beliefs are true, I may not believe the appropriate things. It is possible to occasionally be accurate without understanding. Even a broken clock is correct twice a day, as the old saying goes.

A conception of reality is intentional, not accidental. As long as my representation of reality can fail, there are grounds for skepticism. This bypasses the issues of certainty or evil geniuses. It is a question of whether we can formulate an idea of what exists apart from our limited monkey minds (but still inclusive of minds) that accurately reflects absolute reality.

An Absolute Conception of Reality (ACR) is itself an idea of what we suppose to exist. According to Williams, if knowledge is possible, it has to be possible to form a coherent conception of its object. This coherent concept of the absolute must also be independent of subjectivity and its constraints. An ACR is just a conception “of something.” We must first get a conception of a thing, and then determine if our conception actually represents accurately what it is supposed to represent.

Williams claims that the ACR should not contain secondary properties as a primary aspect. Secondary qualities are to be included in the mental aspect of the ACR. The ACR should be a description of everything which exists-plus minds.

Although the body of theories and data produced by science is impressive, I believe Williams is mistaken in his dismissal of the threat of the Representational Theory of Mind to the question of the nature of reality. Our science could only be confirming what we are already constrained to discover by the limits of our minds. The actuality of reality could be far beyond our conceptions or comprehension. Physics allows us to make fairly reliable predictions about the world, but is this grounds to say that these predictions would hold true even without minds to make them?

The only way we have of dealing with this question is through the medium of our minds. Other cultures have had radically different conceptions of reality. Is our western empirical science true because it has amassed a lot of supporting data and all other views false because they have not? If all adherents of a world view are dead, does that mean that world view was mistaken? If a world view does not produce empirical data to bolster its concepts, does that mean it is wrong?

The Way Out

The Ancient Greeks resemble us moderns in the seriousness with which we regard skepticism. Plato, however, sidestepped a lot of the difficulties which have dogged modern epistemology. For Plato, the criteria of knowledge was not as rigorous as those applied in later eras. For Plato, knowledge consisted merely of a true belief and logos- that is, an explanation or reason in this view, understanding consists in seeing the connections between as opposed to the more contemporary search for justification and certainty. Understanding, to Plato, is a skill directed towards a body of material, not towards the truth value of a single proposition. Knowledge is the perception of how things fit together, and this skillful awareness of interconnection is what allows accomplishment. This is a very different goal than that of certainly or justification.

Plato’s conception of the ideal forms served as his ACR. Plato thought the senses unreliable because the physical world is an impure mixture of all the forms. The forms (or coneptual ideals that reside in a holistic state) themselves are pure, but our world is all combined together. Multiple parts come together and our sense perception may or may not apprehend the different aspects of the combination.

But, Plato assures us that the mind can come to apprehend the pure forms through the process of reason. Under this view, mental apprehension has the potential to be more accurate than sense perception or empirical data. Apprehension of a form is a mental understanding of a pure expression, free from the contradictions and occlusions of particulars- this is what makes it knowledge, as opposed to true opinion.

This use of the forms as ACR matches at least one of Williams’ criteria: that is, it is an objective view of a mind-independent reality which accounts for minds. As far as Williams’ second criteria (that of accurately representing reality), that yet remains to be proven.

However, Plato’s use of forms, for all the difficulties that entails, does allow for many things not included in other ACRs. Plato’s forms, in their impure mixtures, allows for degrees of truth. The degree of a belief’s rational coherence is equivalent to the percent of purity of form in the conception. Truth and falsehood is not always black or white in human experience. Shades of gray reflect the nearness to formal purity. Reason and the subjective apprehension of a larger order serve as the test of the truth of our beliefs.

Under Plato’s position, the truth resides within us and we must refine it through the process of the dialectic. Hence, reason and introspection fill the gap between us and the ACR. I am reminded of Michelangelo’s attitude toward sculpture: he believed that the finished piece of art existed inside the uncarved marble- his job was to remove what was not needed.

Likewise, the truth exists within us-but it remains for us to refine it from the raw ore of our beliefs and opinions. Of course, this view is dependent on rigorous mental training and constant internal questioning in order to determine what is true, but it put humanity in direct contact with the ACR through the medium of reason, producing knowledge.

Escaping Regress and Evil Geniuses

A Platonic view of knowledge avoids regress, as justification is unnecessary. A Platonic construal of knowledge assumes a direct connection between the cosmos and our minds. We can internally accesses the truth (provided we are trained in the process of asking ourselves the right questions), without the resort to the support of propositions.

A looser definition of knowledge, coupled with an ACR based on the forms, produces an epistemology more concerned with understanding the larger context, rather than trying to prove the truth value of a single proposition or group of propositions. E.g. skepticism is also quickly dispatched, as it relies on Cartesian dualism, which assumes an insurmountable chasm between mind and external reality. Under the Platonic model, this chasm is not only spanned, it is eliminated, as humanity holds the potential for knowledge within. Platonic knowledge is holistic and not dualistic.

Conclusion

The three main attacks of skepticism on epistemology are, at the bottom, only different facets of the same problem. All three arise from human uncertainty and fear of error. All three have a similar distrust of human mental capacities to recognize the truth. Plato not only transcends these fears and limitations, he provides the means for testing the accuracy of our representations of reality through the rigors of the dialectic.

But even if I am wrong in lumping together the three types of skepticism as one big problem, only Plato’s position satisfies all three. According to the principles of parsimony, one simple solution is preferable to several more complex solutions.

Both foundationalism and coherentism are concerned with the justification of propositions, and not with any larger understanding of wider contexts. In this respect, they are dangerously shortsighted. By focusing on semantic minutiae, they ignore critical issues and risk irrelevance.

Plato’s approach is not only more comprehensive, it is also more pragmatic and relevant to human experience. I recognize that Plato’s theory of forms does have its share of difficulties, but it seems to me a more promising approach than any others we have explored thus far.


Bibliography

Jon Molin, Plato’s Theory of Understanding, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, WI, London, 1981

Ronald M. Polansky, Philosophy and Knowledge- A commentary on Plato’s Theaetetus, Associated University Press, Cranbury, New York, London, Ontario, 1992

Bernard Williams, Descartes: The Project of Pure Inquiry

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